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Abstract—Constraints such as separation-of-duty are widely used to
specify requirements that supplement basic authorization policies. How-
ever, the existence of constraints (and authorization policies) may mean
that a user is unable to fulfill her/his organizational duties because
access to resources has been denied. In short, there is a tension
between the need to protect resources (using policies and constraints)
and the availability of resources. Recent work on workflow satisfiability
and resiliency in access control asks whether this tension compromises
the ability of an organization to achieve its objectives. In this paper, we
develop a new method of specifying constraints which subsumes much
related work and allows a wider range of constraints to be specified.
The use of such constraints leads naturally to a range of questions
related to “policy existence”, where a positive answer means that an
organization’s objectives can be realized. We analyze the complexity
of these policy existence questions and, for particular sub-classes of
constraints defined by our language, develop fixed-parameter tractable
algorithms to solve them.1
Index Terms—access control; resiliency; satisfiability; computational
complexity; fixed-parameter tractability
1 INTRODUCTION
Access control is a fundamental aspect of the security of
any multi-user computing system, and is typically based on
the specification and enforcement of an authorization policy.
Such a policy identifies which interactions between users
and resources are to be allowed by the system.
Over the last twenty years, authorization policies have
become more complex, not least because of the introduction
of constraints, which further refine an authorization policy.
A separation-of-duty constraint (also known as the “two-
man rule” or “four-eyes policy”) may, for example, require
that no single user is authorized for some particularly
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sensitive group of resources. Such a constraint is typically
used to prevent misuse of the system by a single user.
The use of authorization policies and constraints, by
design, limits which users may access resources. Neverthe-
less, the ability to perform one’s duties requires access to
particular resources, and overly prescriptive policies and
constraints may mean that some resources are inaccessible.
In short, “tension” may exist between authorization policies
and operational demands: too lax a policy may suit orga-
nizational demands but lead to security violations; whereas
too restrictive a policy may compromise an organization’s
ability to meet its business objectives.
Recent work on workflow satisfiability and access con-
trol resiliency has recognized the importance of being able
to identify whether or not security policies prevent an or-
ganization from achieving its objectives [12], [13], [19], [20],
[26]. In this paper, we seek to extend existing work in this
area. Specifically, we introduce the AUTHORIZATION POL-
ICY EXISTENCE PROBLEM (APEP), which may be treated as
a decision or optimization problem. Informally, APEP seeks
to find an authorization policy, subject to restrictions on
individual authorizations (defined by a “base” authoriza-
tion relation) and restrictions on collective authorizations
(defined by a set of authorization constraints). We show that
a number of problems in the literature on workflow satis-
fiability and resiliency are special cases of APEP, thereby
showing that APEP is computationally hard.
The framework within which APEP is defined admits
a greater variety of constraints than is usually considered
in either the standard access control literature [6], [15],
[18], [23] or in workflow satisfiability [1], [7], [26]. In this
paper we characterize the constraints of interest and extend
the definition of user-independent constraints [7] to this
framework. We then establish the complexity of APEP for
certain types of constraints, using both classical and multi-
variate complexity analysis. In this paper, we make some
progress in this direction by establishing the complexity of
APEP for the constraints that we believe will be the most
useful in practice. In particular, we establish connections
between APEP and both the WORKFLOW SATISFIABILITY
PROBLEM and resiliency in access control.
In the next section, we summarize relevant background
material and related work. We introduce the APEP in Sec-
tion 3 and elaborate on the nature of the constraints we con-
sider in Section 4. We then discuss further constraint types
and connections between APEP and existing problems in
the literature. In Section 6, we investigate the complexity of
several variants of the APEP. We conclude the paper with
a summary of our contributions and some ideas for future
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work.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A number of interesting (and computationally hard) prob-
lems arise naturally in the context of authorization policies
and constraints. However, the relative sizes of the param-
eters in many of these problems mean that it is fruitful to
analyze these problems using multivariate complexity anal-
ysis. In this section, we review some of those problems and
provide a brief introduction to fixed-parameter tractability.
2.1 Fixed-parameter tractability
Many problems take multiple inputs and the complexity
of solving such problems is determined by the sizes of
those inputs. In general, a problem may be hard in terms
of the total size of the input. However, if we consider the
complexity of a problem under an assumption that some
of the parameters of the input are small and terms that
are exponential in those parameters are acceptable, then
we may discover that relatively efficient algorithms exist to
solve the problem.
More formally, an algorithm is said to be fixed-parameter
tractable (FPT) if it solves a decision problem in time
O(f(k)p(n)), where k is some (small) parameter of the
problem, n is the total size of the input, and f and p are,
respectively, a computable function and a polynomial. As is
customary in the literature on FPT algorithms, we will often
write O(f(k)p(n)) as O∗(f(k)). (That is, O∗ suppresses
polynomial factors, as well as multiplicative constants.) If
a problem can be solved using an FPT algorithm then we
say that it is an FPT problem and that it belongs to the
class FPT [14], [21]. An FPT algorithm for a hard problem
is particularly valuable when k is significantly smaller than
n for most instances of the problem that arise in practice.
While many NP-complete problems admit FPT algo-
rithms, many other NP-complete problems do not admit
such algorithms unless certain parameterized complexity-
theory assumptions fail, which is highly unlikely [14], [21].
In particular, the WORKFLOW SATISFIABILITY PROBLEM is
highly unlikely to admit an FPT algorithm [26]. However,
if all constraints are user-independent, then the problem is
FPT and efficient algorithms have been developed to solve
practical instances of the problem [7], [11], [16]. Since the
APEP is an extension of the WORKFLOW SATISFIABILITY
PROBLEM, it is also highly unlikely to admit an FPT algo-
rithm. In this paper we identify important restrictions to the
general APEP which do admit such algorithms.
2.2 Workflow satisfiability
A workflow may be modeled as a set of steps in some au-
tomated business process. An authorization relation deter-
mines which users are authorized to perform which steps,
and constraints restrict which subsets of users may perform
subsets of steps [4], [9], [26]. Given a set of users U , a set
of workflow steps S, an authorization relation A ⊆ S × U ,
and a set of constraints C , a plan π : S → U is a function
allocating users to steps. A valid plan must allocate an
authorized user to each step and every constraint must be
satisfied. The WORKFLOW SATISFIABILITY PROBLEM (WSP)
asks whether there exists a valid plan for a given U , S, A
and C . Basin, Burri and Karjoth model a workflow (with
“break points”) as a process algebra and introduced the
notion of an enforcement process, which is analogous to a
valid plan [1]. This leads naturally to the enforcement pro-
cess existence problem, which is analogous to the workflow
satisfiability problem and inspires the name for the problem
we study in this paper.
Wang and Li observed that fixed-parameter algorithmics
is an appropriate way to study WSP, because the number
of steps is usually small and often much smaller than the
number of users.2 Wang and Li [26] proved that WSP is
FPT if we consider only separation-of-duty and binding-
of-duty constraints [26]. We will write such constraints
as (s, s′, 6=) and (s, s′,=), respectively, where s, s′ ∈ S.
A plan π satisfies a constraint (s, s′, 6=) ((s, s′,=), respec-
tively) if π(s) 6= π(s′) (π(s) = π(s′), respectively). WSP
with only separation-of-duty constraints (only binding-of-
duty constraints, respectively) will be denoted by WSP(6=)
(WSP(=), respectively). Subsequent research has shown that
WSP remains FPT even if additional types of constraints,
notably user-independent [7] and class-independent con-
straints [10], are permitted in the input to WSP. Note that
WSP is not FPT in general [26] unless a widely-accepted
hypothesis in complexity theory fails; a significant body of
research suggests this is highly unlikely [14].
2.3 Static separation-of-duty constraints
Constraints have been studied extensively in the context of
role-based access control (RBAC) [15], [18], [23], [25]. In its
simplest form, a static separation-of-duty constraint may be
defined as a pair of roles {r, r′} belonging to the set of roles
R. A user-role assignment relation UR ⊆ U ×R, where U is
the set of users, satisfies the constraint {r, r′} if there is no
user u such that (u, r) and (u, r′) belong to UR.
More generally, Li, Tripunitara and Bizri [18] introduced
the notion of a k-out-of-n static separation-of-duty con-
straint, defined as a pair (R′, n), where R′ is a subset of R of
cardinality k. A user-role assignment relation UR ⊆ U × R
satisfies the constraint (R′, n) if there is no set of t users,
where t < k, that are collectively authorized for R′. That is,
for all subsets V of U such that |V | < k,⋃
u∈V
{r : (u, r) ∈ UR} ⊂ R′.
Note that the simple separation-of-duty constraint defined
by a pair of roles {r, r′} is a 2-out-of-2 separation-of-duty
constraint.
2.4 Resiliency
Li, Wang and Tripunitara introduced the idea of resiliency
in access control [19]. Informally, a resiliency policy is a
requirement that even in the absence of a limited number
of users the remaining users can be authorized for some
set of resources such that given constraints are satisfied.
The existence of both a resiliency policy and authorization
2. The SMV loan origination workflow studied by Schaad et al., for
example, has 13 steps and identifies five roles [24]. It is generally
assumed that the number of users is significantly greater than the
number of roles.
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constraints may mean that no authorization relation can
satisfy all requirements. Li et al. introduce a number of
problems investigating whether an authorization relation
does exist for a given resiliency policy [19].
3 THE AUTHORIZATION POLICY EXISTENCE PROB-
LEM
In this paper, we extend existing work on workflow satis-
fiability, constraints and resiliency, by defining a simple yet
very expressive authorization framework. Roughly speak-
ing, we specify a problem concerned with the existence of
an appropriate authorization relation.
Given a set of users U and a set of resources R to which
access should be restricted, we may define an authorization
relation A ⊆ U × R, where (u, r) ∈ A if and only if u is
authorized to access r. Given a resource r, we will write
A(r) to denote the set of users that are authorized to access
resource r. More formally, A(r) = {u ∈ U : (u, r) ∈ A}.
Similarly, for u ∈ U , we will write A(u) to denote the
set of resources that u is authorized to access, that is
A(u) = {r ∈ R : (u, r) ∈ A}. We extend this notation to
subsets of R and U in the natural way: for R′ ⊆ R and
U ′ ⊆ U ,
A(R′)
def
=
⋃
r∈R′
A(r) and A(U ′) def=
⋃
u∈U ′
A(u).
We introduce two fundamental concepts, which will be
used to formulate the AUTHORIZATION POLICY EXISTENCE
PROBLEM.
• a base authorization relation ABse ⊆ U × R such that
ABse(r) 6= ∅ for each r ∈ R;
• a set of authorization constraints C .
Informally, ABse specifies restrictions on all valid authoriza-
tion relations, while C specifies additional restrictions that
any valid authorization relation must satisfy.
An authorization constraint may be defined by enu-
merating the set of all authorization relations that satisfy
the constraint. Of course, an extensional definition of this
nature is utterly impractical, and all useful constraints will
be defined in an intensional manner. A simple example
would be a constraint requiring no user is assigned to both
resources r and r′. In other words, an authorization relation
A satisfies this constraint provided that {(u, r), (u, r′)} 6⊆ A
for all u ∈ U . We discuss constraints in more detail in
Section 4.
More formally, we have the following definitions. Given
a base authorization relation ABse and a set of constraints C ,
we say an authorization relation A ⊆ U ×R is
• authorized with respect to ABse if A ⊆ ABse;
• complete if A(r) 6= ∅ for every r ∈ R;
• eligible with respect to c ∈ C if A satisfies c;
• eligible with respect to C if A satisfies c for all c ∈ C ;
• valid with respect to ABse and c ∈ C if A is authorized,
complete and eligible with respect to c; and
• valid with respect to ABse and C if A is authorized,
complete and eligible with respect to C .
We introduce the term AUTHORIZATION POLICY EXIS-
TENCE PROBLEM (APEP) as a generic term for questions
concerned with finding a valid authorization relation, given
ABse and C . Then APEP comes in two “flavors”: (a) De-
cision (D-APEP): Does there exist a valid authorization
relation? If so, find a valid authorization relation. (b) Op-
timization (O-APEP): Find a “best” valid authorization
relation if one exists (where the objective function has to
be specified).
We assume that determining whether an authorization
relation satisfies a constraint takes polynomial time. (This
is a reasonable assumption for all constraints of relevance
to access control.) Let n denote |U |, k denote |R| and m
denote |C|. Then a brute force approach to solving D-APEP
(by simply examining every possible authorization relation)
takes time O∗(2nk).
A few special cases of APEP are worth mentioning.
For simplicity we will write ASol to denote one of the
authorization relations that are solutions to APEP.
1) ASol is required to be a function ASol : R → U . In this
case, we allocate a unique user to each resource. Com-
puting a plan allocating one user to each step in a work-
flow instance, subject to an authorization policy defined
by ABse and some constraints C , is an example of this
type of scenario. In this case, D-APEP corresponds to
the WORKFLOW SATISFIABILITY PROBLEM (WSP) [26].
Moreover, the CARDINALITY-CONSTRAINED MINIMUM
USER PROBLEM [22], whose solution is a plan using the
minimum number of users, is an instance of O-APEP.
2) ABse = U × R. In this case, ABse itself imposes no
restrictions on ASol. All restrictions on ASol are defined
by the constraints C . Defining an authorization policy
in the presence of static separation-of-duty constraints
is an example of this type of scenario. Li, Tripunitara
and Bizri have studied problems of this nature [18].
3) A constraint that requires each resource is assigned to
at least t users enables us to model problems related
to resiliency in access control [19] and workflow sys-
tems [26].
4) If we seek to maximize the cardinality of ASol, then,
informally, a solution to O-APEP provides a “resilient”
authorization policy. While this is different from exist-
ing notions of resiliency [19], [26], it would seem to
be an interesting way of approaching the problem of
making an authorization policy resilient to the unavail-
ability of users.
4 CONSTRAINTS
We now describe constraints in more detail. We generalize
the approach used in prior work on constraints for work-
flow systems [13], [26].
4.1 Binding-of-duty and separation-of-duty constraints
Binding-of-duty and separation-of-duty constraints have re-
ceived considerable attention in the access control literature,
and such constraints may be static or dynamic. Informally,
static constraints specify restrictions on policy relations,
whereas dynamic constraints specify constraints on partic-
ular sequences of events within the context of an access
control system. A (static) separation-of-duty constraint, for
example, in the context of role-based access control system,
might require that no user is authorized for both roles r
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and r′ [23]. In contrast, a (dynamic) separation-of-duty con-
straint, in the context of a workflow system, might simply
require that two steps s and s′ are performed by differ-
ent users in each instance of the workflow [9], [26]. (This
constraint, however, does not prevent the same user being
authorized for both those steps.) Within the framework of
APEP, we seek to define a more general (and uniform)
syntax and semantics for constraints.
We express constraints in terms of the following logical
(binary) operators defined via their respective truth tables:
p q p↔ q p→ q p← q p l q
0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0
Let r and r′ be resources in R; let ◦ denote one of the
logical operators in the set {↔,←,→, l}; and let Q be one
of the first-order quantifiers ∃ or ∀. Then (r, r′, ◦, Q) is a
constraint: a constraint of the form (r, r′, ◦,∀) is said to be
universal, while a constraint of the form (r, r′, ◦,∃) is said to
be existential. A complete relation A
• satisfies (r, r′, ◦,∃) if there exists u ∈ A(r)∪A(r′) such
that the propositional formula (u ∈ A(r)) ◦ (u ∈ A(r′))
evaluates to true; and
• satisfies (r, r′, ◦,∀) if for all u ∈ A(r)∪A(r′), the propo-
sitional formula (u ∈ A(r)) ◦ (u ∈ A(r′)) evaluates to
true.
Note that for any complete relation A and any r ∈ R,
A(r) 6= ∅, so A(r) ∪ A(r′) 6= ∅. Thus constraints cannot
be vacuously satisfied by a valid relation.
Informally speaking, universal constraints are
“stronger” than existential constraints: (for any complete
relation) the satisfaction of (r, r′, ◦,∀) implies the
satisfaction of (r, r′, ◦,∃), but the converse does not
hold.
We now expand these generic definitions for the four
constraints defined by (r, r′, ◦, Q), where ◦ is either↔ or l:
1) (r, r′,↔,∃) is satisfied if there exists u ∈ U such that
u ∈ A(r) and u ∈ A(r′); that is, A(r) ∩A(r′) 6= ∅.
2) (r, r′, l,∃) is satisfied if there exists u ∈ U such that
either (i) u ∈ A(r) and u 6∈ A(r′) or (ii) u 6∈ A(r) and
u ∈ A(r); that is, A(r) 6= A(r′).
3) (r, r′,↔,∀) is satisfied if for all u ∈ A(r) ∪ A(r′), u ∈
A(r) if and only if u ∈ A(r′); that is, A(r) = A(r′).
4) (r, r′, l,∀) is satisfied if for all u ∈ A(r) ∪ A(r′), either
(i) u ∈ A(r) and u 6∈ A(r′) or (ii) u 6∈ A(r) and u ∈
A(r′); that is, A(r) ∩A(r′) = ∅.
Thus, constraints of the form (r, r′, l, Q) correspond closely
to the idea of separation-of-duty. Indeed, the satisfaction
criterion for (r, r′, l,∀) is identical to that for a simple static
separation-of-duty constraint. Similarly, constraints of the
form (r, r′,↔, Q) correspond to the idea of binding-of-duty.
Now consider a constraint of the form (r, r′,→,∀). Such
a constraint is satisfied if for all u ∈ A(r) ∪ A(r′), (u ∈
A(r)) → (u ∈ A(r′)). In other words, A(r) ⊆ A(r′). Thus
a global constraint of this form could be used to specify a
role hierarchy (in which role r′ is senior to r). Conversely, a
constraint of the form (r, r′,←,∀) could be used to specify
a role hierarchy in which r′ is junior to to r.3 Thus we can
use constraints to insist that a hierarchy is strict: that is,
there exists at least one user that is assigned to r′ but not r.
Specifically, a relation A simultaneously satisfies constraints
(r, r′,→,∀) and (r, r′, l,∃) only if A(r) ⊂ A(r′).
4.2 Cardinality constraints
We may also define cardinality constraints, which come in
two flavors. In the following, C is a binary relation belong-
ing to the set {=, <,>,6,>} and t is an integer greater than
0.
• A global (cardinality) constraint has the form (C, t). The
constraint (C, t) is satisfied by relationA if for all r ∈ R,
|A(r)| C t.
• A local (cardinality) constraint has the form (R′,C, t),
where R′ ⊆ R. The constraint (R′,C, t) is satisfied by
relation A if |A(R′)| C t.
Then, for example, the global constraint (=, 1) requires
a valid relation A to be a function (since the num-
ber of users assigned to each resource is precisely 1),
while the local constraint ({r} ,6, t) is a cardinality con-
straint in the RBAC96 sense [23] (if resource r is inter-
preted as a role). Finally, the k-out-of-n static separation-
of-duty constraint ssod({r1, . . . , rk} , n), introduced by Li
et al. [18], may be represented by the cardinality constraint
({r1, . . . , rk} ,>, n).
Remark 1. If we define a global constraint (=, 1), then the
universal constraint (r, r′, ◦,∀) is equivalent to the existential
constraint (r, r′, ◦,∃) (in the sense that the former is satisfied if
and only if the latter is).
4.3 User-independent constraints
Research on the WORKFLOW SATISFIABILITY PROBLEM has
shown that the notion of user-independent (UI) constraints is
very important. First, the class of UI constraints includes a
very wide range of constraints and almost all constraints
that are of relevance to access control. Thus, we believe
that many constraints of interest for applications in the
future will also be user-independent. Second, WSP is fixed-
parameter tractable (FPT) if we restrict attention to UI con-
straints [7]. (WSP is not FPT if we allow arbitrarily complex
constraints [26].) Informally, a constraint is UI in the context
of workflow satisfiability if its satisfaction only depends on
the relationships that exist between users assigned to steps
in a workflow (and not on the specific identities of users) [7].
We now extend the definition of user-independent used in
the context of workflow satisfiability.
Let A be an authorization relation and σ : U → U
a permutation of the user set (that is, σ is a bijection).
Then, given an authorization relation A ⊆ U × R, we write
σ(A) ⊆ U×R to denote the relation {(σ(u), r) : (u, r) ∈ A}.
A constraint c is user-independent if for every authorization
relation A that satisfies c and every permutation σ : U → U ,
σ(A) satisfies c.
Consider, for example, a constraint of the form (r, r′,↔
,∃) and suppose that A ⊆ U × R satisfies the constraint.
3. Since A(r) and A(r′) are non-empty, the constraints (r, r′,←, ∃)
and (r, r′,→, ∃) are both equivalent to (r, r′,↔,∃).
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Then, by definition, there exists a user u such that (u, r), (u, r′) ∈
A. Then, for any permutation σ, (σ(u), r), (σ(u), r′) ∈ σ(A),
so σ(A) also satisfies the constraint. Similar arguments may
be used to show that constraints of the form (r, r′,↔,∀),
(r, r′, l,∃) and (r, r′, l,∀) are all UI. Equally, it is clear that
global and local constraints, whose satisfaction is defined in
terms of the cardinality of sets of the form A(r), are UI,
since a permutation (being a bijection) will preserve the
cardinality of such sets. In other words, all constraints we
consider in this paper are UI.
4.4 Bounded UI constraints
We now define an important class of UI constraints that will
be useful for establishing positive results in the remainder
of the paper. Given a base relation ABse and a constraint c,
let A be valid with respect to ABse and c. We say A requires
v if {(u, r) ∈ A : u 6= v} is not valid. (Since A is valid, this
means that {(u, r) ∈ A : u 6= v} is either incomplete or does
not satisfy c.) Then we define
core(A : ABse, c)
def
= {u ∈ U : A requires u}
to be the core of A with respect to ABse and c.
Consider for instance a constraint c of the form (r, r′, l
,∀). If there exists an authorization relation A satisfying c,
then there is one whose core contains at least two users:
indeed, remove iteratively from A any pair (u, r) ∈ A such
that A does not require u. When this is no longer possible,
the obtained relation has to allocate two distinct users to r
and r′, both belonging to the core. The core could contain
as many as k users, since the relation may allocate each
resource to a different user and removing any user would
compromise the completeness of the relation. However, the
core cannot contain more than k users, since in any set of
at least k + 1 users, at least two users must be allocated
to the same resource and one of them could be removed
without compromising the completeness or the eligibility of
the relation. Conversely, for a constraint of the form (r, r′,↔
,∀) the core could contain a single user but no core contains
more than k − 1 users, since r and r′ must be assigned to
the same user and any additional users may be removed
without compromising completeness or eligibility.
Proposition 2. Let I = (ABse, C) be a satisfiable instance of
D-APEP with a UI constraint c ∈ C . If A is a valid solution
with respect to ABse and c then
|core(A : U ×R, c)| ≥ |core(A : ABse, c)|
Proof. We prove the more general statement that
core(A : ABse, c) ⊆ core(A : Ω, c)
for any Ω ⊇ ABse. Suppose A requires u and let A \ u
denote {(v, r) ∈ A : u 6= v}. Then A \ u is either incomplete
or violates c (since A is authorized, so is A \ u). If A \ u is
incomplete, then it is also incomplete for the instance (Ω, c).
The same argument holds ifA\u violates c, which concludes
the proof.
Definition 3. We say a UI constraint c is f(k, n)-bounded if
|core(A : U ×R, c)| 6 f(k, n) for all A valid with respect to
U ×R and c.
The definition of f(k, n)-bounded constraints and Propo-
sition 2 impose an upper bound on the number of users
we need to consider when constructing candidate solutions
to an instance (ABse, C) of D-APEP, and thus plays an
important role in determining whether a particular variant
of APEP is FPT. In particular, we show in Section 6 that
D-APEP is FPT when all constraints are f(k)-bounded for
some function f .
We have the following elementary results, the proofs
of which can be found in the appendix. The results are
summarized, for ease of reference, in Table 1.
Proposition 4. Constraints (r′, r′′,→,∀), (r′, r′′,↔,∀) and
(r′, r′′,↔,∃) are (k − 1)-bounded.
Proposition 5. Constraints (r′, r′′, l,∀) and (r′, r′′, l,∃) are
k-bounded.
Proposition 6. Constraints (R′,≤, t) and (≤, t) are k-bounded.
Remark 7. Obviously, Proposition 6 remains true when we re-
place ≤ with <. However, it does not hold if we replace ≤ by = or
≥. Indeed, a constraint such as (=, t) requires that some set of t
users cannot be removed. Hence, if t is not bounded by a function
of k only, the constraint is not f(k)-bounded for any computable
function f .
Proposition 8. Constraints (R′,=, t) and (R′,≥, t) are
2 max{k, t}-bounded, but not (max{k, t} − 1)-bounded.
Constraint Type Largest Core
(r, r′, l, ∀), (r, r′, l, ∃) k
(r, r′,↔, ∀), (r, r′,→,∀), (r, r′,↔, ∃) k − 1
(R′,≤, t), (≤, t) k
(R′,=, t), (R′,≥, t) 2max {k, t}
TABLE 1: Upper bounds on the size of the core
4.5 Notation
In the remainder of this paper, we consider versions of APEP
in which we restrict our attention to particular types of
constraints. We use the following abbreviations for families
of constraints: (i) BoD to denote the family of all existential
and universal (binding-of-duty) constraints having the form
(r, r′,↔,∃) or (r, r′,↔,∀); (ii) SoD to denote the family of
all existential and universal (separation-of-duty) constraints
having the form (r, r′, l,∃) or (r, r′, l,∀); (iii) BoDE and
BoDU to denote, respectively, the family of all existential
and universal binding-of-duty constraints; (iv) SoDE and
SoDU to denote, respectively, the family of all existential and
universal separation-of-duty constraints; (v) f(k)-bounded
to denote f(k)-bounded constraints; (vi) Gcard to denote the
family of all global cardinality constraints; (vii) Lcard to de-
note the family of all local cardinality constraints. Finally, we
write, for example, APEP〈BoD, Lcard〉 to restrict the set of
instances of APEP in which the set of constraints C contains
only binding-of-duty and local cardinality constraints.
5 FURTHER APPLICATIONS OF APEP
In Section 6, we establish the computational complexity of
a number of variants of APEP. In particular, we prove that
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APEP is FPT provided all constraints are f(k)-bounded. In
this section, we consider a number of extensions to the basic
constraints we have already defined and their relevance
as extensions to authorization policies. We also discuss a
number of problems associated with constraints and poli-
cies from the literature and demonstrate why they may be
considered to be instances of APEP, thereby establishing that
these problems are FPT.
5.1 Constraint types
In Section 4.1 we identified a number of constraint types
of the form (r, r′, ◦, Q), where r and r′ are resources, ◦ is
a logical binary operator, and Q is a quantifier. For ease of
reference we summarize these constraints and the respective
conditions for satisfaction in Table 2.
(r, r′,↔, ∀) A(r) = A(r′)
(r, r′,↔, ∃) A(r) ∩A(r′) 6= ∅
(r, r′, l,∀) A(r) ∩A(r′) = ∅
(r, r′, l,∃) A(r) 6= A(r′)
(r, r′,→, ∀) A(r) ⊆ A(r′)
TABLE 2: Constraint types defined in Section 4.1
We chose to introduce the constraints shown in Table 2
because of their obvious connections to known constraints
in the literature and to simplify the exposition of the tech-
nical material. We now discuss ways in which these con-
straints could be extended. Notice that the satisfaction of
each constraint may be defined in terms of A(r) and A(r′).
One obvious extension, then, is to define constraints of
the form ((r1, . . . , rm), ◦, Q), and to define constraint sat-
isfaction in terms of A(ri), 1 6 i 6 m. We may define
constraint satisfaction in a number of ways, including (but
not limited to) the following: (i) for all i and j, 1 6 i <
j 6 m, (ri, rj , ◦, Q) is satisfied; or (ii) for some i and j,
1 6 i < j 6 m, (ri, rj , ◦, Q) is satisfied. Note, however, that
the first of these choices can be realized simply by defining
a set of constraints {(ri, rj , ◦, Q) : 1 6 i < j 6 m}.
Consider the constraint ((r1, . . . , rm), l,∀), and suppose,
as another alternative for constraint satisfaction, we require
that
⋂m
i=1A(ri) = ∅. In other words, there is no user that
is assigned to all resources in the set {r1, . . . , rm}. It is easy
to see that such a constraint is k-bounded (since removing
a user from a valid relation can only affect completeness,
not the eligibility, of the relation). Thus, with this inter-
pretation, ((r1, . . . , rm), l,∀) represents a canonical SMER
constraint [18] (if the set of resources is interpreted as a set
of mutually exclusive roles). We return to SMER constraints
in Section 5.3.
Another possible extension is to define constraints of
the form (R′, R′′, ◦, Q) and to define constraint satisfaction
in terms of A(R′) and A(R′′). For example, the constraint
(R′, R′′, l,∀) requires that A(R′) ∩ A(R′′) = ∅. Again,
constraints of this form are k-bounded. In other words,
the users assigned to resources in R′ are different from the
users assigned to resources in R′′. This constraint, therefore,
allows us to specify that resources should be allocated to
disjoint teams of users (rather than just individual users). Of
course such constraints could be nested: we might define
a further constraint (R′′1 , R
′′
2 , l,∀) where R′′1 and R′′2 are
subsets of R′′.
5.2 Resiliency in access control
Suppose we are given an authorization relation A ⊆ U ×R
and a set of resources Q ⊆ R. Then a resiliency policy
is defined by a tuple (Q, s, d, t), where s, d and t are
integers [19]. The policy is satisfied if, following the removal
of any s users from U , there exist d disjoint teams of users,
U1, . . . , Ud, such that A(Ui) ⊇ Q and |Ui| 6 t for each i.
The resiliency checking problem [19] asks whether a re-
siliency policy is satisfiable or not. It has been shown that the
hard part of the problem is finding the teams (since we can
enumerate all possible user sets that are missing s users), so
research has focused on solving the problem for instances in
which s = 0 [12], [19].
Informally, a solution of the resiliency checking problem
may be viewed as a function mapping (different copies of
the set of) resources to users. Thus we can transform an
instance of the resiliency checking problem (where s = 0)
into an instance of D-APEP. We define d copies of each
resource in Q; we write r(i) to denote the ith copy of
resource r in Q. We then define
ABse =
{
(u, r(i)) : (u, r) ∈ A, 1 6 i 6 d
}
.
Finally, we define the global constraint (=, 1) and, for all
r1, r2 ∈ Q and all i and j such that 1 6 i < j 6 d, we define
a constraint (r(i)1 , r
(j)
2 , l,∀). The authorization relation ABse
ensures that each user is authorized according to the original
relation A. The global constraint ensures that each resource
is assigned to a single user. The other constraints ensure that
a user is only assigned to resources in one copy of Q.
The results in Section 6.2 assert that the resulting prob-
lem is FPT. Hence, the resiliency checking problem is also
FPT (confirming an earlier result of Crampton et al. [12]).
Note, finally, that we can simplify the above construc-
tion, using the constraints introduced in Section 5.1: we use
Q(i) to denote the ith copy of the set of resources Q and
define the set of constraints{(
Q(i), Q(j), l,∀
)
: 1 6 i < j 6 d
}
.
5.3 Resiliency and separation of duty
The RBAC96 standard discusses constraints based on mutu-
ally exclusive roles [23]. Such a constraint is defined by a set
of roles Rmutex and is satisfied by the user-role assignment
relation provided no user is assigned to more than one role
in Rmutex.
Li, Tripunitara and Bizri introduced the more general
static mutually exclusive role (SMER) constraints [18], which
have the form (Rmutex, t), where t 6 |Rmutex|. (A canonical
SMER constraint has t = |Rmutex|.) Such a constraint is satis-
fied provided every user is assigned fewer than t of the roles
in Rmutex. We can check whether a user-role assignment
relation satisfies a SMER constraint in polynomial time [18],
informally because we only need to consider each user once.
Li et al. went on to distinguish SMER constraints from
static separation of duty (SSoD) policies [18], which are de-
fined by a set of permissions P and an integer t 6 |P |.
Such a constraint is satisfied if no subset of fewer than t
users is collectively authorized for the permissions in P .
Checking whether a SSoD policy is satisfied by a given user-
role assignment relation is computationally hard, informally
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because we need to consider every possible subset of users
having cardinality less than t.
Li, Wang and Tripunitara studied the complexity of
determining whether it was possible to simultaneously sat-
isfy static separation of duty constraints and a resiliency
policy [19]. Unsurprisingly, it is computationally hard to
decide this question, given that it is hard to decide whether
an authorization relation satisfies a static separation of duty
policy [18]. However, they did not consider the possibility of
simultaneously satisfying SMER constraints and resiliency
policies. Now observe that a SMER constraint is user-
independent and is k-bounded. Thus, for example, it is
possible to develop an FPT algorithm to determine whether
there exists an authorization relation A ⊆ U × R such
that a resiliency policy and a set of SMER constraints are
simultaneously satisfied.
6 COMPLEXITY OF APEP
Before exploring the fine-grained complexity of D-APEP
with respect to the different types of constraints, we first
state general properties of some special cases.
Firstly, note that adding the function constraint F to any
D-APEP instance having only SoD or BoD constraints forces
any solution ASol of D-APEP to be a function. In this case,
D-APEP becomes equivalent to WSP. More formally, we say
that a parameterized problem A is parameter-reducible to a
parameterized problem B (and we write A ≤fpt B) if there
is a polynomial algorithm which transforms an instance
(I, k) of A into an instance (I ′, k′) of B such that (I, k)
is positive for A iff (I ′, k′) is positive for B, and k′ ≤ f(k)
for some computable function f . Clearly, if A is parameter-
reducible to B and B is FPT, then A is FPT. We say that
A is parameter-equivalent to B (and we write A =fpt B) if
A ≤fpt B and B ≤fpt A. The proof of the following result is
straightforward, by the definition of the function constraint
F.
Theorem 9. If D-APEP and WSP are parameterized by the
number of resources and steps, respectively, we have the following:
• D-APEP〈SoD,F〉 =fpt WSP(6=);
• D-APEP〈BoD,F〉 =fpt WSP(=); and
• D-APEP〈BoD,SoD,F〉 =fpt WSP(=, 6=).
Moreover, the following result asserts that adding BoDU
constraints to any instance of D-APEP does not change its
(parameterized) complexity.
Theorem 10. Given any instance (U,R,ABse, C) of
D-APEP〈BoD,SoD〉, one can obtain in polynomial time an
instance (U,R′, A′Bse, C
′) of D-APEP such that: (i) C ′ does not
contain any BoDU constraint, (ii) |A′Bse| ≤ |ABse|, (iii) |R′| ≤
|R|, and (iv) |C ′| ≤ |C|.
Proof. Let C∗ be the set of BoDU constraints from C . The
idea is to consider BoDU constraints as an equivalence rela-
tion: for r, r′ ∈ R, r ∼b r′ if and only if (r, r′,↔,∀) ∈ C∗.
Now, let R′ = {R1, . . . , Rq} be the equivalence classes of
∼b. Obviously, |R′| ≤ |R|. For all i ∈ [q] and all r ∈ Ri,
let A′Bse(r) denote
⋂
r′∈Ri ABse(r
′). Once again, it holds that
|A′Bse| ≤ |ABse|. Finally, for every constraint c = (r, r′,∼, Q)
in C \ C∗ with ∼ ∈ {=, 6=} and Q ∈ {∀,∃}, we distinguish
two cases:
• if r ∈ Ri and r′ ∈ Rj with i 6= j, then add the constraint
(Ri, Rj ,∼, Q) (notice that in this case c is not a BoDU
constraint);
• if r, r′ ∈ Ri for some i ∈ [k], then if c is a SoDU or SoDE
constraint, obviously the instance is unsatisfiable (and
we can output a trivially negative instance of D-APEP).
Clearly |C ′| ≤ |C|, and C ′ does not contain any BoDU
constraint. Finally, one can check that the output instance is
satisfiable if and only if the input instance is satisfiable.
Remark 11. A corollary of Theorem 10 is that we may exclude
BoDU constraints from consideration when establishing FPT
results.
In the remainder of this section, we establish that D-
APEP with bounded constraints is FPT. We also propose
extra algorithms for some mixed policies composed of BoD
and SoD constraints in order to improve the execution
time of the main algorithm for these subcases. Figure 1
summarizes our results for D-APEP with BoD and SoD
constraints.
BoDE,SoDU,SoDE
FPT: 22
kk2
BoDE
P
SoDU
FPT: 2k
SoDE
FPT: 2k
BoDE,SoDU
FPT: 2k
2 log k2
BoDE,SoDE
FPT: 22
kk2
SoDU,SoDE
FPT: 22
kk2
Fig. 1: Complexity of specific cases of D-APEP (polynomial
factors are ignored)
6.1 Instances with constraints of a single type
As a direct application of Theorem 10, we are able to show
that D-APEP〈BoDU〉 is polynomial-time solvable: indeed,
after using the reduction of the previous result, it is clear
that the instance is satisfiable if and only if A′Bse is complete.
Theorem 12. D-APEP〈BoDU〉 is solvable in polynomial time.
We now consider the complexity of D-APEP〈SoDU〉 and
D-APEP〈BoDE〉.
Theorem 13. D-APEP〈SoDU〉 =fpt D-APEP〈SoDU,F〉.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that there always exists a feasi-
ble solution of D-APEP〈SoDU〉 which satisfies the function
constraint F.
Let us suppose (U,R,ABse, C) is satisfiable, so there
exists a valid solution ASol for this instance. We define
another relation A′ which is a function. For any r ∈ R,
we have |ASol(r)| ≥ 1, thus we can pick an arbitrary user
ur in ASol(r) and set A′(r) = {ur}. One can observe that
A′ ⊆ ASol ⊆ ABse, and thus A′ is indeed a function. For a
constraint (r, r′, l,∀) ∈ C , we have ASol(r) ∩ ASol(r′) = ∅,
but since A′(r) ⊆ ASol(r) and A(r′) ⊆ ASol(r′), we
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have A′(r) ∩ A′(r′) = ∅ as well. Thus, A′ is valid for
(U,R,ABse, C
′) and is clearly a function.
Since, by Theorem 9, D-APEP〈SoDU,F〉 =fpt WSP(6=),
and since WSP(6=) is NP-hard and FPT parameterized by
the number of steps [13], we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 14. D-APEP〈SoDU〉 is NP-hard and FPT parame-
terized by k.
In fact, it follows from [13] that D-APEP〈SoDU〉 can be
solved in time O∗(2k). We now consider BoDE constraints.
Theorem 15. D-APEP〈BoDE〉 is polynomial-time solvable.
Proof. We show that an instance (U,R,ABse, C) is satis-
fiable iff ABse is valid. Obviously, if ABse is valid, the
D-APEP〈BoDE〉 instance is satisfiable. Conversely observe
first that ABse is obviously authorized and complete. Then,
if D-APEP〈BoDE〉 is satisfiable, there exists ASol ⊆ ABse,
which is valid. However, since ASol(r) ⊆ ABse(r) for any
r ∈ R, any constraint (r, r′,↔,∃) satisfied by ASol is also
satisfied by ABse. In other words, ABse is eligible.
6.2 Complexity of D-APEP〈f(k)-bounded〉
Let f be an arbitrary function in k and let I =
(U,R,ABse, C) be a D-APEP instance containing only f(k)-
bounded constraints. Without loss of generality, we assume
that f(k) ≥ k (observe that all constraints considered in this
paper are never better than (k−1)-bounded). In this section,
we introduce a method to decide whether I is satisfiable or
not in time O∗
(
22
kf(k)k
)
.
Given a set of resources T ⊆ R, we define
UT = {u ∈ U : ABse(u) = T}
We call UT the (user) family associated with T . Note that for
T 6= T ′, we have UT ∩ UT ′ = ∅. Moreover, U =
⋃
T⊆R UT .
Thus {UT }T⊆R is a partition of U containing at most 2k sets.
The intuition behind this definition is that when considering
UI constraints (in particular, f(k)-bounded constraints), all
users in a set UT play the same role. The idea of the
algorithm is thus to eliminate users in “large” families to
upper-bound the number of users by a function of k. To
eliminate users, we apply the following reduction rule:
if there exists T ⊆ R such that |UT | > f(k), then
remove an arbitrary user u∗ from UT .
Successive applications of this rule will result in an instance
in which the number of users is at most f(k)2k, a function
of k only.
Consider, for example, an instance comprising the base
authorization relation ABse shown in Figure 2 (k = 3 and
n = 8) and a single constraint (r1, r2, l,∃). The constraint
(r1, r2, l,∃) is 3-bounded. There are three families of users,
of which U{r1,r2} has cardinality greater than 3. Applying
the reduction rule, we may remove users u3 and u4 from
U{r1,r2}.
Lemma 16. I is satisfiable iff I ′ is satisfiable, where I ′ is the
instance obtained by applying the reduction rule to I .
Proof. Obviously, if I ′ is satisfiable, then so is I .
Assume I satisfiable and I ′ unsatisfiable, and let A
be a solution for I . Then there exists T ⊆ R such that
r1 r2 r3
u1, u2 1 1
u3,u4, u5, u6, u7 1 1
u8 1 1 1
Fig. 2: Use of the reduction rule
|UT | ≥ f(k) + 1 ≥ k+ 1, which means that A violates some
constraint c ∈ C (i.e. unsatisfiability of I ′ does not come
from incompleteness). Since c is f(k)-bounded, we have
|core(A : I)| ≤ f(k) and thus |core(A : I) ∩ UT | ≤ f(k).
But, since |UT | ≥ f(k) + 1, and since c is user independent,
we may assume, without loss of generality, that there is a
user u∗ ∈ UT such that u∗ /∈ core(A : I). However, u∗ is
a user whose removal makes the instance unsatisfiable, a
contradiction.
Theorem 17. For any computable function f depending only on
k, D-APEP〈f(k)-bounded〉 is FPT parameterized by k.
Proof. Whenever the reduction rule can be applied, we
remove one user from the instance. If the rule cannot be
applied, then we have an instance with at most 2kf(k)
users. Applying a brute force algorithm (by checking every
possible relation for the reduced user set), one can check the
satisfiability in time O∗
(
22
kf(k)k
)
.
Corollary 18. D-APEP〈SoD,BoD〉 is FPT parameterized by k.
Proof. The result follows from Propositions 4, 5, and Theo-
rem 17.
More generally, as we proved in Section 4.4 that car-
dinality constraints with symbol ≤ or < are k-bounded,
such constraints can be added to any D-APEP〈SoD,BoD〉
instance without degrading the execution time. Concerning
cardinality constraints with symbols ≥, > or =, we have the
following corollary of Proposition 8.
Corollary 19. For any computable function f depending only on
k, D-APEP〈f(k)-bounded,Gcard, Lcard〉 is FPT parameterized
by k plus the maximum cardinality of all cardinality constraints.
6.3 Complexity of D-APEP〈BoDE,SoDU〉
We now prove that a better running time can be obtained
when considering only BoDE and SoDU constraints.
Theorem 20. D-APEP〈BoDE,SoDU〉 can be solved in time
O
(
2k
2 log k2
)
.
Proof. We reduce to WSP(=, 6=). Let R = {r1, . . . , rk}. We
build a WSP(=, 6=) instance, denoted by (S′, U ′, A′, C ′). We
set U ′ = U . Then, for any i ∈ [k], let
Γ(ri) = {j ∈ [k] : (ri, rj ,↔,∃) ∈ C}.
For each resource ri ∈ R, we introduce a set of steps Si. If
Γ(ri) = ∅, then Si = {si}. Otherwise, Si = {sij : j ∈ Γ(ri)}.
Then define S′ =
⋃
i∈[k] S
i. Observe that |S′| ≤ k(k − 1).
We then define the following constraints:
• For any i ∈ [k], if Γ(ri) 6= ∅, then for all j ∈ Γ(ri), we
add the constraint (sij , s
j
i ,=).
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• For any i, j ∈ [k], if (ri, rj , l,∀) ∈ C , then, for every s ∈
Si and every s′ ∈ Sj , we add the constraint (s, s′, 6=).
Finally, we define the authorization policy A′. For every i ∈
[k] and every u ∈ U :
• If Γ(ri) = ∅, then (u, si) ∈ A′ iff (u, ri) ∈ ABse.
• If Γ(ri) 6= ∅, then ∀j ∈ Γ(ri), (u, sij) ∈ A′ iff
(u, ri), (u, rj) ∈ ABse.
The construction is illustrated in Figure 3 for a small
example. Clearly this construction can be carried out in
polynomial time.
r1
r2
r3
r4
↔
↔
l
l
(a) C
s12
s21
s13 s
3
1
s4
= 6=
=
6=
6=
(b) C′
ABse r1 r2 r3 r4
u1 1 1 1
u2 1 1
u3 1 1
u4 1 1
u5 1 1
(c) ABse
A′ s12 s
1
3 s
2
1 s
3
1 s
4
u1 1 1 1 1
u2 1
u3 1 1
u4 1 1
u5 1
(d) A′
Fig. 3: Reducing D-APEP〈BoDE,SoDU〉 to WSP(=, 6=)
Let us suppose there is a valid plan π : S′ → U ′ for
(S′, U ′, A′, C ′). We set Aπ = {(u, ri) : i ∈ [k], π(s) = u for
some s ∈ Si}. One can observe that Aπ is authorized and
complete. Then, for any i, j ∈ [k] such that (ri, rj ,↔,∃) ∈
C , we must have π(sij) = π(s
j
i ) = u for some u ∈ U , which
implies that u ∈ Aπ(ri) ∩ Aπ(rj). Then, if (ri, rj , l,∀) ∈ C ,
we know that π(s) 6= π(s′) for any s ∈ Si and any s′ ∈ Sj ,
which implies that Aπ(ri) ∩ Aπ(rj) = ∅. This proves that
Aπ is valid.
Conversely, we suppose (U,R,ABse, C) is satisfiable,
and let ASol be a valid solution. For any i ∈ [k], we have
the following:
• If Γ(ri) = ∅, then define π(si) to be an arbitrary user in
ASol(ri).
• If Γ(ri) 6= ∅, then, for every j ∈ Γ(ri), define π(sij)
as an arbitrary user in ASol(ri) ∩ ASol(rj), and set also
π(sij) = π(s
j
i ).
One can observe that π is authorized and complete. By
construction, every constraint
(
sij , s
j
i ,=
)
∈ C ′ is satisfied.
Finally, for every s, s′ ∈ S′ such that (s, s′, 6=), it must be
the case that s ∈ Si and s′ ∈ Sj such that (ri, rj , l,∀) ∈ C ,
which implies that ASol(ri) ∩ ASol(rj) = ∅. Hence we must
have π(s) 6= π(s′), and π is a valid plan.
6.4 Complexity of MAXAPEP〈SoDU〉
We now introduce a particular version of O-APEP, which
seeks to find a valid authorization relation of maximum
cardinality. We write MSol to denote the cardinality of such
a relation. Such a relation is, in some sense, a most resilient
authorization relation possible, given the authorization con-
straints. We call this problem MAXAPEP. (We may also de-
fine a decision version APEP to find resilient authorization
relations. We may, for example, introduce a global constraint
(>, t), which requires that at least t users are authorized for
each resource. These types of problems are related to notions
of resiliency in workflow systems [26].)
In this section, (ABse, C) is an APEP〈SoDU〉 instance. In
Theorem 13, we established that D-APEP〈SoDU〉 could be
reduced to D-APEP〈SoDU,F〉. Let Π denote the set of valid
solutions to instance (ABse, C ∪ {(=, 1)}) (that is, functions
π : R → U ). Given a function π ∈ Π, we say A ⊆ U × R
contains π if and only if for every r ∈ R, (π(r), r) ∈ A.
Let Mπ denote the maximum size of a valid authorization
relations containing π. Theorem 13 established that any
solution ASol of APEP〈SoDU〉 contains at least one function
π ∈ Π. We write MSol to denote max {Mπ : π ∈ Π}.
6.4.1 Patterns
A function π : R→ U defines an equivalence relation∼π on
R, where r ∼π r′ iff π(r) = π(r′). The equivalence classes
defined by this relation form a partition of R which we call
the pattern associated with π and denote it by P (π). We
say two functions π and π′ are equivalent if P (π) = P (π′).
For UI constraints and any two functions π and π′ such
that P (π) = P (π′), π is eligible iff π′ is eligible. Hence,
we will say P is eligible if and only if, there exists π such
that P = P (π) and π is eligible for C . Henceforth, we
only consider eligible patterns. We write MP to denote
max {Mπ : P (π) = P}. There exists an eligible pattern P
such that MSol = MP .
Let us suppose that we are able, given a pattern P , to
construct a valid A, such that |A| = MP , in FPT time
f(k)nO(1). There are at most Bk eligible patterns, where
Bk is the Bell number and Bk = O(2k log k) [2].4 Then,
MAXAPEP〈SoDU〉 would be FPT: exploring all the eligible
patterns and applying the FPT algorithm to compute MP
for each P is executed in time O∗(2k log kf(k)). As a conse-
quence, our objective now is to design a FPT algorithm to
compute AP such that |AP | = MP .
6.4.2 Exploring patterns to solve MAXAPEP〈SoDU〉
Lemma 21. Let P = {T1, T2, . . . , Td} be a pattern. An autho-
rization relation AP , such that |AP | = MP , can be computed in
FPT time O∗(2k).
Proof. Clearly d ≤ n. We extend P into P ∗ in order to
have |P ∗| = n. We set P ∗ = {T1, . . . , Td, ∅1, . . . , ∅n−d} =
{T1, . . . , Tn} . We build a weighted bipartite graph GP =
(P ∗ ∪ U,E, ω), where (Ti, u) ∈ E if and only if Ti ⊆
ABse(u) and for any i ∈ [n− d] and u ∈ U , (∅i, u) ∈ E.
Assign to (Ti, u) ∈ E weight ω(Ti, u) which is the cardinal-
ity of the maximum independent set in ABse(u) containing
Ti:
ω(Ti, u) = max
∀(r,r′)∈X2, (r,r′,l,∀)/∈C
Ti⊆X⊆ABse(u)
|X|
There are at most n2 weights to compute. For any e ∈ E,
calculation of every ω(e) can be performed in time O(2k) by
4. All logarithms in this paper are of base 2.
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enumerating all subsets of ABse(u). Thus the bipartite graph
GP can be built in time O∗(2k). We solve the ASSIGNMENT
PROBLEM on GP and obtain a maximum weighted match-
ing (MWM), M, in polynomial time using the Hungarian
algorithm [17].
For every edge e ∈ M we compute an independent set
Xe as follows. For each (Ti, u) ∈M, choose a maximum in-
dependent setX(Ti,u) such that Ti ⊆ X(Ti,u) ⊆ ABse(u) and,
therefore,
∣∣X(Ti,u)∣∣ = ω(Ti, u). We define the authorization
relation AM such that AM(u) = X(Ti,u).
For any u ∈ U , AM(u) ⊆ ABse(u). Furthermore, for
any u ∈ U , AM(u) contains resources which are pairwise
independent, so AM is valid. We define the function π̃ such
that π̃(r) = u if and only if r ∈ Ti and (Ti, u) ∈ M. AM
contains π̃ whose pattern is P . Thus, |AM| ≤MP .
We know that there exists a valid function π such that
MP = Mπ and P (π) = P = P (π̃). There exists a matching
M′ representing π in GP . If π(Ti) = u, then (Ti, u) ∈M′. If
π−1(u) is empty, we associate u with an arbitrary vertex ∅i.
Since |AM| is equal to the weight of the MWM M of GP ,
we have Mπ ≤ |AM|. Hence, MP = |AM|.
In Figure 4, we use a simple example to illustrate the
matching process described in the proof of Lemma 21. We
consider the pattern P = {{r1, r4} , {r2} , {r3}} and merge
∅1 and ∅2 into a single node to keep the bipartite graph
readable. The figure shows GP (derived from ABse) and the
resulting MWM (where the matching is indicated by the
thick lines). Then, for example, ω({r3} , u3) = 2 because
X = {r1, r3} is the largest independent subset of ABse(u3)
containing r3.
r1 r2
r3r4
(a) Constraints
r1 r2 r3 r4
u1 1
u2 1 1
u3 1 1 1
u4 1 1
u5 1
(b) Base relation ABse
{r1, r4}
{r2}
{r3}
∅1, ∅2
u1
u2
u3
u4
u5
(c) GP
{r1, r4}
{r2}
{r3}
∅1, ∅2
u1
u2
u3
u4
u5
(d) MWM
Fig. 4: Computing a maximum weighted matching for an
instance of MAXAPEP〈SoDU〉
Theorem 22. MAXAPEP〈SoDU〉 (and thus D-APEP〈SoDU〉)
can be solved in FPT time O∗(2k+k log k).
Proof. We explore all eligible patterns P . For each one, we
constructAP using Lemma 21, and keep the largest one. The
time complexity of this algorithm is O∗
(
2k+k log k
)
. Hence,
it is FPT parameterized by k.
6.5 Complexity of D-APEP〈SoDE〉
In this section, we solve the MAXAPEP〈SoDE〉 problem by
reducing to the MAX WEIGHTED PARTITION problem [5]: that
is, given a ground set K and p functions f1, . . . , fp from
2K to integers from the range [−M,M ], M ≥ 1, find a
partition {K1, . . . ,Kp} of K that maximizes
∑p
i=1 fi(Ki).
The following result is a corollary of the main theorem on
MAX WEIGHTED PARTITION in [5].
Lemma 23. MAX WEIGHTED PARTITION can be solved in time
O∗(2kp2M).
Theorem 24. D-APEP〈SoDE〉 and MAXAPEP〈SoDE〉 can be
solved in time O∗(2k).
Proof. We reduce to the MAX WEIGHTED PARTITION prob-
lem. The ground set is R, and we construct weight func-
tions indexed by sets, which are elements of a family χ
of subsets of U . We say that two resources r, r′ ∈ R are
independent if and only if (r, r′, l,∃) /∈ C . Moreover, the
degree d(r) of a resource r ∈ R is the number of resources
r′ such that (r, r′, l,∃) ∈ C . The index set χ is defined
as
⋃
r∈R χr , where χr consists of all subsets of ABse(r) if
|ABse(r)| ≤ log k, or d(r) + 1 largest subsets of ABse(r) if
|ABse| > log k (breaking ties arbitrarily). For every X ∈ χ,
we define a weight function fX : 2R → [−|ABse| − 1, |ABse|]
as follows: for every T ⊆ R, fX(T ) is set to |T ||X| if T
is an independent set and X ⊆ ABse(r) for every r ∈ T ,
and fX(T ) = −|ABse| − 1 otherwise. Now, we show that
any valid authorization relation ASol of D-APEP〈SoDE〉
corresponds to a partition of R of cost |ASol|, and vice versa.
Let T = {TX : X ∈ χ} be a partition ofR of nonnegative
weight. Note that if fX(TX) ≥ 0 for every X ∈ χ then∑
X∈χ fX(TX) ≤ |ABse|. Thus, since T is of nonnegative
weight, fX(TX) ≥ 0 for every X ∈ χ. Construct an
authorization relation ASol such that for any X ∈ χ, for
any r ∈ TX , we have ASol(r) = X . Obviously, since T is a
partition of R, ASol is complete. Then, by definition of χ,
we have ASol(r) ⊆ ABse(r) and thus ASol is authorized.
Finally, for any r, r′ ∈ R such that ASol(r) = ASol(r′),
it must hold that r, r′ ∈ TASol(r), and since TASol(r) is
independent, (r, r′, l,∃) /∈ C , and ASol is eligible. In other
words, ASol is a valid authorization relation, and its weight
is
∑
X∈χ fX(TX).
For any valid authorization relation ASol, let P (ASol) be
the partition of R into equivalence classes with respect to
the following equivalence relation: r, r′ ∈ R are equivalent
if and only if ASol(r) = ASol(r′). We now prove that there
always exists a valid authorization relation A′Sol of size
at least |ASol| such that A′Sol(r) ∈ χ for every r ∈ R.
If this is true, then it will mean that we may assume
that P (ASol) = {TX : X ∈ χ}, and since ASol is valid,∑
X∈χ fX(TX) = |ASol|. For r ∈ R, if |ABse(r)| ≤ log k,
then since χ contains all subsets of ABse(r), it holds that
ASol(r) ∈ χ. If |ABse(r)| > log k and ASol(r) /∈ χr , recall
that χr consists of d(r)+1 largest subsets of ABse(r). Hence,
there must exist X ∈ χr such that ASol(r′) 6= X for every
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r′ such that (r, r′, l,∃) ∈ C . Hence, replacing ASol(r) by
X creates another valid authorization relation A′Sol of size
at least |ASol| and such that A′Sol(r) ∈ χr . Repeating this
modification for every r ∈ R such that ASol(r) /∈ χ, we end
up with a valid authorization having the desired property.
Using the reduction above together with Lemma 23, we
prove the claimed statement.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced a general framework
within which we can specify problems concerned with
finding authorization relations (“policies”) that must satisfy
certain kinds of constraints. We have shown that there exist
FPT algorithms to solve the authorization policy existence
problem when all constraints are user-independent and
are bounded in an appropriate way. We have also shown
that many constraints of practical interest are indeed user-
independent and bounded.
Our prior work on implementing FPT algorithms for
the workflow satisfiability problem [8] suggests that the
theoretical results obtained in this paper should translate to
relatively efficient algorithms in practice; certainly far more
efficient than a brute-force approach to solving APEP. We
hope to confirm this expectation by developing practical
implementations of the algorithms described in this paper.
Although we have chosen to consider user-independent
constraints, not least because such constraints have been
studied extensively in the literature on workflow satisfia-
bility, we could equally well consider resource-independent
constraints, because our framework is symmetric in a way
that workflow satisfiability questions are not. So, for exam-
ple, we could define a constraint of the form (u, u′, l,∀)
which would be satisfied provided the set of resources
assigned to u is distinct from the set of resources assigned
to u′. In this way, we search for authorization relations
that guarantee certain users do not have access to the same
resources. Moreover, if the number of users is small relative
to the number of resources, which may well be the case in
some multi-user systems (such as file systems), then n will
be the small parameter and the symmetry of our framework
admits FPT algorithms for solving problem instances of this
form.
We believe there are many opportunities for future work,
not least exploring what types of authorization constraints
might be useful in practice and determining whether those
constraints are user-independent and bounded.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 4. Let c be one of (r′, r′′,→,∀),
(r′, r′′,↔,∀) or (r′, r′′,↔,∃). Let V be a set of k − 1
distinct users and consider A, where A(r′) = A(r′′) = {u}
for some u ∈ V and, for any r1, r2 ∈ R \ {r′, r′′},
|A(r1)| = 1, A(r1) 6= A(r′), and A(r1) 6= A(r2). Then
core(A : U × R, c) = V and |core(A : U ×R, c)| = k − 1.
Moreover, for any relation A′ valid with respect to U × R
and c, any subset ofA′(R) of size at least k must contain two
users who are both assigned to the same resource; thus one
of them can be removed without affecting completeness or
satisfiability. Hence, the constraint is (k − 1)-bounded.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let V be a set of k distinct users and
consider A where |A(r)| = 1 for each r ∈ R and A(R) = V .
Then core(A : U × R, c) = V and |core(A : U ×R, c)| = k.
Now, for any for any relation A′ valid with respect to U ×R
and c, any subset of A′(R) of size at least k+1 must contain
two users who are both assigned to the same resource,
and thus one of them can be removed without violating
completeness or satisfiability. Thus |core(A′ : U ×R, c)| 6
|core(A : U ×R, c)|, from which the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6. Given any valid solution A, the re-
moval of any user cannot make A non-eligible with re-
spect to c = (R′,≤, t), but may violate completeness. Hence,
core(A : U × R, c) is largest when |A(r)| = 1 for all r and
A(R) = k, in which case we have |core(A : U ×R, c)| = k.
(The global cardinality constraint c = (≤, t) is k-bounded
because, in this case too, no removal affects the eligibility of
the relation; it can only affect the completeness.)
Proof of Proposition 8. We only give the proof for (R′,=, t),
the other one being similar. One can observe that core(A :
U × R, c) is largest when |A(r)| = 1 for any r ∈ R \ R′,
|A(R\R′)| = |R\R′|, andA(R′)∩A(R\R′) = ∅. In this case
we have |core(A : U ×R, c)| ≤ |R \R′|+ t ≤ 2 max{k, t}.
Concerning the negative result, observe that if
max{k, t} = t, then no user of A(R′) can be removed
from any valid solution, and if max{k, t} = k, then there
exists solutions in which A(R) ≥ k and the removal of
any user from A(R) either violates a constraint or breaks
completeness.
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